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Discussant's Response to 
Relationship of Auditing Standards 
To Detection of Fraud 
John J. Willingham 
University of Houston 
I believe it fair to begin by summarizing George Catlett's paper as an 
affirmation of the conventional wisdom of the accounting profession. Adherence 
to the standards of a profession must always be seen by responsible citizens as 
admirable, and therefore criticism is difficult. In this regard, I w i l l not present 
esoteric criticism that sometimes characterizes the remarks of teachers i n situa-
tions such as this, nor w i l l I dwell at length on selected statements i n the paper. 
However, i f you w i l l indulge me, I wish to respond to one statement because 
it sets a tone for the paper and for the conventional wisdom of the profession 
which I would like to see changed. Under the heading "Representations by 
Clients," the following statement can be found: "[Auditors ' ] . . . responsibili-
ties do not include infallibility or clairvoyance." 
"Responsibilities" of CPAs 
In this statement, as well as in many other parts of the paper, either ex-
plicitly or implicitly, Catlett suggests that the detection of fraud could become 
a "responsibility" and an onerous one at that. Presently it is reasonably clear, 
at least to accounting practitioners and students, that detection of fraud is not 
an objective of the ordinary examination of financial statements. However, should 
this objective be undertaken by C P A s , it would not necessarily constitute a new 
"responsibility." Should such an objective be assumed, it seems likely that it 
would result from a demand for service either directly from clients or indirectly 
from clients through a governmental or other agency charged to represent the 
public. Further, I might add, that assumption of such a "responsibility" should 
carry with it appropriate remuneration. 
I am suggesting that the services or functions of a profession evolve over 
time and the nature of these services is dictated largely by customers who 
demand services and are wi l l ing to pay for them. Finally, I am also suggesting 
that the accounting profession should feel flattered and privileged to be asked 
to extend its services to a desirous public. This is, of course, a simplification of 
the rather complex problem of attesting to the material absence of fraud i n the 
operations of an entity. T o clarify my position, however, I would like to take 
up several specific topics included i n the subject paper and attempt to relate 
them to this potential extension of the attest function. 
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Nature of Fraud 
The paper outlines the nature of fraud i n a manner that should be satisfy-
ing to most accountants. Examples of various types of fraud are listed and even 
these examples appear to be inclusive of the vast majority of frauds that are 
perpetrated. However, the paper dwells at length on cases of fraud which are 
concealed through collusion and tends to ignore defalcation and embezzlement 
by individuals. Catlett states that " . . . major cases usually include collusion 
among officers and/or employees, or collusion with outside persons." C P A 
firms certainly should be able to support a statement such as this one. I cannot, 
but I do know that there are many individuals now i n prison who were convicted 
of embezzlement and who did not collude wi th anyone. Many of you probably 
w i l l remember the study of defalcators published over 20 years ago i n The 
Journal of Accountancy. The study by Donald Cressey centered on convicted 
defalcators incarcerated at Illinois State Prison at Joliet. Cressey's purpose was 
to determine the causes of defalcations. H e generalized about the process of 
defalcation i n the following way: 
Trusted persons become trust violators when: (1) they conceive 
of themselves as having a financial problem which is non-sharable; (2) 
have the knowledge or awareness that this problem can be secretly 
resolved by violation of the position of financial trust; and (3) are able 
to apply to their own conduct in that situation a verbalization which 
enables them to adjust their conceptions of themselves as trusted persons 
with their conceptions of themselves as users of the entrusted funds or 
property. Unless there is movement through this sequence, a trusted 
person does not become a violator. 1 
This study along with other studies by students of D r . Cressey have indi-
cated that some types of fraud do not include collusion. If an auditor were to 
attest to the material absence of fraud, he should consider this type of fraud 
as well as such misrepresentations by management as over- or under-statement 
of assets and liabilities and irregular and/or deceitful transactions. Presently, 
auditors have an excellent opportunity to uncover an individual defalcation 
through the review and evaluation of internal control. A l l pronouncements on 
the nature of internal control emphasize division of duties and responsibilities 
in a manner that prevents errors and defalcations unless collusion exists. If most 
perpetrators (at least those who are caught and convicted) have nonsharable 
problems and perpetrate embezzlements wi th no collusive help, the auditor 
should be able to discern weaknesses i n the control system which could allow 
for the existence of such fraud with the use of current internal control evalua-
tion standards and procedures. 
Audit Objectives 
Apparently, some frauds involve collusive arrangements, but some do not. 
It would seem that all should be included i n any definition of fraud if a stance 
is taken on the subject of attesting to the material absence of fraud. However, 
a more important consideration to this discussion concerns objectives of audits. 
Historically, these objectives have changed. Brown suggests that the detection 
of fraud was recognized as a major audit objective until at least 1940.2 H e 
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also indicates that beginning around the turn of the century fairness began to 
overshadow detection of fraud as a stated audit objective, and that detection 
of fraud seemed to disappear as a stated audit objective around 1940 due largely 
to the effect on the profession of the McKesson & Robbins case. Perhaps the 
discussion of the auditor's responsibility for the detection of fraud has not yet 
diminished because it was a stated audit objective for over 400 years and was 
removed as an objective by the profession rather than by a change i n demand 
of clients of accounting firms. A solicitous consuming public could reinstate it. 
If this were to happen, the terms might be more advantageous for C P A s than 
they were during the period previous to the McKesson & Robbins case. 
The detection of fraud as an audit objective might resurface as a part of the 
ordinary examination of financial statements or as a special examination of 
financial statements. Recently there has been much more interest i n attestation 
of representations other than those which appear i n historical financial state-
ments. Forecasts and interim financial statements are two possible extensions 
of the attest function that are of current interest to the profession. 
Whether the potential extension of the auditor's opinion is forecasts, interim 
financial statements, or detection of fraud, history indicates that the process w i l l 
evolve slowly over time. A n y extension probably w i l l not result from a sudden 
pronouncement of the A I C P A ; instead, any such pronouncement w i l l follow 
rather widespread practice i n the field. Should detection of fraud again become 
a stated audit objective, either as a part of the ordinary examination of financial 
statements or through a demand for special reports asserting the absence of fraud, 
auditing standards must be judged for their appropriateness to the task. 
Auditing Standards 
Current general and field work standards seem to apply equally well to 
audits of financial statements and to audits designed to detect the existence of 
fraud. As mentioned earlier, the requirement for review and evaluation of 
internal control should ferret out all but the most insignificant embezzlement 
or defalcation perpetrated by a lone individual. The search for other types of 
fraud seems to be covered by the third standard of field work which requires 
"sufficient competent evidential matter." That standard goes on to indicate that 
this evidence should be obtained "through inspection, observation, inquiries, and 
confirmations." A l l of the types of fraud that result from situations other than 
"nonsharable problems" are transaction based. Purchases, sales, cash receipts, 
and cash disbursements are recorded and result i n balances that appear i n 
accounts. If the balances are incorrect due to fraud, evidence of that fraud 
should be available. This evidence may not always be conclusive, as sometimes 
seems to be true in the ordinary examination of financial statements. Neverthe-
less, some evidence w i l l exist. 
Because accounting data are transaction based, evidence theory indicates 
that auditors should corroborate client representations by obtaining information 
from the other party to the transaction or a third independent party such as a 
bank. Evidence is gathered by auditors i n the field by applying this theory 
through the use of confirmations (a direct means) and such things as examina-
tion of invoices and cancelled checks (an indirect means). In summary, auditing 
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standards seem broad enough to encompass audits for the purpose of detection 
of fraud. 
In most of the fraud cases that are covered in the literature there are prob-
lems of interpretation of auditing standards, and i n a few cases, apparent viola-
tions of them. A s M r . Catlett suggests, standards must be distinguished from 
procedures and I would suggest that it is procedures used i n applying standards 
that might have to be changed should fraud detection become an objective of 
either a special examination or the ordinary examination of financial statements. 
Audi t ing Procedures 
The changes that should occur in audit procedures are really changes that 
should occur whether or not fraud detection becomes an objective of the ordinary 
examination. T o discover any characteristic of a population of data, sampling 
techniques can be used. Discovery sampling, for example, seems particularly 
appropriate to investigation of potential frauds. Discovery sampling is not par-
ticularly helpful i n situations where fraudulent transactions or behavior constitute 
an extremely minor percent of the transactions or behavior experienced i n an 
organization. However, i f fraud is material, such techniques could be helpful. 
Scientific sampling currently is very helpful i n the ordinary examination of 
financial statements. The characteristics of interest are different, but the purpose 
is identical: to discover characteristics and assess their importance. It is difficult 
to assess the degree to which statistical sampling is utilized by auditors, but it 
seems clear from the literature that it is far more reliable than judgment sampling 
techniques. Should detection of fraud become an objective of the auditor's 
examination, scientific sampling certainly would have to be used i n order to 
assess the risk taken i n attesting to the absence of material fraud. Also, an 
auditor should be interested i n assessing the risk he is now taking i n his opinion 
on financial statements for an ordinary examination where fraud is explicitly 
denied as an objective. 
One additional example of an audit procedure that might change should 
fraud again become an audit objective is confirmation. It is my understanding 
that negative confirmation requests are still quite prevalent i n spite of the fact 
that when an auditor does not receive a reply from a request, he has no basis 
for determining whether the amount to be confirmed is correct or the respondent 
is nonexistent, uninterested, or unresponsive. In an audit of accounts receivable, 
if confirmation requests were sent and the objective were to determine whether 
the accounts receivable were fraudulently stated, I do not believe that many audi-
tors would want to rely on the use of negative confirmations. Instead, positive 
confirmations would be utilized with careful and extensive followup. Again , 
I would suggest that such procedure would be appropriate i n the ordinary 
examination where the objective is not detection of fraud; however, it becomes 
much more important when the objective is detection of fraud. 
Professional A u d i t Service 
Earlier, it was suggested that the use of the term "responsibility" perhaps 
was inappropriate. Instead it was suggested that demands for C P A s ' services 
should be treated as opportunities and privileges to serve society. W h e n such 
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requests are made, they represent recognition by society that C P A s have the 
competence and the integrity to perform the services requested. Competence 
often is brought into arguments against extension of the attest function to other 
areas. In such arguments it is suggested that the competence of C P A s lies i n 
their abilities as accountants and that to attest anything or offer a service that 
is outside of the field that has been known traditionally as accounting would 
be to engage i n services beyond their abilities and that therefore the public 
might lose confidence. This , of course, could happen; however, i n my opinion 
C P A s w i l l not seek out engagements i n which they must offer a service that 
they have not offered previously. Rather, society w i l l ask C P A s to provide the 
new service. This has happened i n many instances over the years to the extent 
that management services departments of C P A firms engage i n salary surveys, 
executive search and other activities that cannot be considered, even remotely, 
as traditional accounting services. Thus far, no consequent loss of public con-
fidence has occurred. 
Although I am not a practitioner, I think there is one change that should 
be made i n the practice of public accounting, should requests for extensions of 
the attest function and other services be made by the public. In almost every 
profession, some allowance is made i n the fee structure for the relative risk 
involved. Delicate surgical operations are more expensive than routine low-risk 
surgical operations. W i t h the possible exception of some securities registrations, 
C P A s apparently have not built into their bil l ing structures any allowance for 
risk that might be present i n a given engagement. Should C P A s be asked to 
attest to the absence or presence of material fraud, it would seem wise to adjust 
bil l ing methods to allow for risks being undertaken. Again , there is a parallel 
to attestation of financial statements. Given current litigation against accountants, 
it would seem appropriate for C P A s to assess risk i n each ordinary engagement 
and adjust the fee according to the estimate of the risk to be undertaken. 
Conclusion 
Services or functions of any profession evolve over time and should be 
seen as opportunities or privileges. A t the same time, professionals should assess 
the value of their services and the risks that may be involved and bi l l clients 
accordingly. Furthermore, historically, audit examinations with some stated 
objective have been undertaken before standards were developed. As indicated 
previously, Brown asserted i n his article that audits occurred prior to the year 
1500 and were carried on for hundreds of years before auditing standards were 
developed. A more recent example is that of attesting to some aspects of fore-
casts. Such services have been performed and are being performed now by 
C P A s without any explicit standards. Therefore, I think it is unreasonable to 
assume that standards should be developed before examinations wi th the stated 
objective of detection of fraud can be undertaken. 
Finally, there is one important suggestion that comes from this paper. M r . 
Catlett made assertions about the nature of fraud which can be substantiated 
through research. If there is client interest i n attestation to the absence or 
existence of material fraud, research should be undertaken i n the area. Almost 
all C P A firms maintain files with experiences catalogued i n many different ways. 
As a first step, it would be interesting to examine the files of C P A firms catalog-
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ing all types of fraud that have been discovered either during the course of an 
examination or afterward. A classification system for this examination might 
include type of fraud, method of concealment, industry, client size, and the 
circumstances surrounding the discovery of the fraud. Only after extensive 
research of this type can the profession properly assess the likelihood of discovery 
of fraud and the risk the C P A is taking when he attests to the absence of it. 
Catlett's paper concludes with the following statement: " . . . the account-
ing profession must not permit itself to be destroyed by assuming responsibilities 
or accepting a role that cannot be successfuly fulfilled." I would add to that 
statement that the accounting profession must not permit itself to be destroyed 
by refusing to provide requested services to society. Destruction in this latter 
case w i l l be much slower but nonetheless definite. 
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